An unexpected connection on LinkedIn. An offer of employment from a headhunter, probably a young woman, operating from China. The chance to make around £20,000 part-time writing a small number of geopolitical analyses for a firm from China containing “non-public” or privileged insights. Payment in digital currency or cash preferred.
It might appear clear, in this scenario, that something about this approach would be suspicious. Nevertheless, China’s powerful intelligence agency continues to view it valuable to use headhunters to attempt this – prompting MI5 to warn repeatedly about their operations online.
Massive Contact Attempts on Professional Networks
In 2023, the head of MI5 Ken McCallum said operatives from China were approaching Britons on LinkedIn on an unprecedented scale, at a frequency of 10,000 over the previous 30-month period, seeking governmental, industrial, defense and scientific secrets. However a fresh initiative targeting elected officials and Westminster has prompted the spy agency to take further action.
An espionage warning was issued on this week via the offices of the Commons speaker and his Lords equivalent: a brief presentation after the repeated efforts of certain individuals and Amanda Qiu to reach out to Members of Parliament, lords, their assistants, economists, research organizations – anybody who might become a source.
Security Strategy and Legal Changes
In the curious style of UK security services, there was no official release of the security advice from MI5 or the Home Office. But the service was aware its advisory document would leak once it was emailed out to Westminster. Republishing it in the media helps the wider public better identify communications with a deceptive intent.
This warning has the effect of flushing out more information from in and around Westminster, though that is not MI5’s main objective. The agency aims for people in public life to understand that just because exchanges on LinkedIn are less overtly risky as on X or Facebook, it does not mean they are without risk.
Nor is internal security service believed to have been responding to a particular event in parliament, though the burst of activity does come after the awkward failure of the prosecution of a former parliamentary aide an individual and his friend Christopher Berry on a legal detail earlier in the autumn.
Both individuals had been charged of spying for China – a charge they denied – but inability to successfully conclude a trial under the now repealed previous legislation led to concerns that the UK's political system had been insufficiently defended.
Updated Legislation and China's Long-Term Interests
Legislation has now been changed, and the security briefing contains a reminder of its successor: “Those engaging in espionage activity risk substantial criminal penalties under the National Security Act.” This constitutes a crime if somebody engages in conduct that is or is likely to “materially assist a overseas spy agency”.
A natural question, however, is what Beijing has to achieve. A politician who is not a government minister will have limited knowledge of sensitive information, and an associate of theirs even less. Yet Beijing is also interested in parliament: for a period, in 2020 and 2021, the Britain's China policy on matters such as Huawei or the human rights situation or genocide was being driven by parliamentarians.
Cultural Differences and Persistent Cyber Risks
In part there are cultural differences too. Autocratic regimes like China’s export intelligence collection techniques and the size of its intelligence apparatus is vast, engaging three hundred thousand people. A former US official, a American cybersecurity head under the US administration, said it was sometimes estimated that “the Chinese have more English speakers engaged in this than Western agencies have personnel with language skills”.
The Chinese government is prepared to cultivate contacts over the extended period and sometimes even the agencies have struggled to differentiate genuine connections and espionage. “Beijing has a minimal requirement for what information is considered to be of value,” security minister Dan Jarvis informed parliamentarians on Wednesday, but a rapid shift in the political cycle may mean an individual rapidly marginal turning significant.
Another way to think about the relentless efforts at secret information gathering is in the broader framework of the geopolitical contest between Beijing and the Western nations at a level below the level of direct conflict. China has increased its cyber operations, with the Salt Typhoon penetration of communications systems in 80 countries, and the another operation compromise of countless connected equipment.
Beijing is engaged in persistent attempts to find covert sources on British democracy online because it seeks to be challenging, to demonstrate influence and because it can.